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Abstract 
Reparations activism has forced many large multinational insurance corporations to 
disclose their early profiteering from underwriting slavery and the slave trade. This 
paper further contributes to the reparative project of tracing slavery’s occluded 
legacies by analyzing aspects of the development of British, French and American 
marine insurance law in response to shipboard rebellion in the transatlantic slave 
trade, and the American ‘domestic’ maritime slave trade. It explores the ways in 
which marine insurance developed and adapted its ancient legal concepts – notably, 
the concept of ‘inherent vice’ - to the requirements of commodifying life for the 
purposes of modern slave trading. This history further illuminates the conceptual 
lineaments and practices that were involved in the slave trade’s processes of 
dehumanization but it also highlights the ways in which marine insurance lawyers, in 
the face of shipboard rebellion, were compelled debate not only the humanity of the 
enslaved but their desire for freedom. In this context, the archive of marine insurance 
offers an unexpected route into the history of resistance to slavery.  
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The question of how we can further and more concretely specify the multiple legacies 
of transatlantic slavery is currently at issue both inside and outside the academy. The 
campaign for slavery reparations has been reactivated and the extent of contemporary 
human trafficking is raising questions about the legal history of enslavement and its 
afterlives. At the same time, the memorialization of Atlantic slavery is taking shape 
but in the context of an increasingly reactionary set of public discourses about racial 
justice. In short, questions of how to relate the imperial past of slaving – the forced 
transportation of twelve million Africans to the New World between the sixteenth and 
nineteenth centuries - to an uneasily multicultural present is the subject of raw and 
contested public debate in a variety of ways and places. Most broadly, the conjuncture 
of these current concerns seem to be coalescing around a set of interrelated questions 
concerning the historical construction of ‘race, the global production of labour, the 
formation of cultural identity and the shifting meanings of freedom.   
The question of how we define, and chart, slavery’s legacies is highly charged 
not least in intellectual, political and historiographical terms. The material long-term 
consequences of slavery, which can be traced in economic, political and institutional 
terms, are dialectically related to the ways in which slavery shapes historical forms of 
collective memory. The first set of issues includes critical investigations of the 
historical making of ‘race’ and the ways in which its meanings are expressed in 
histories of exclusion, disenfranchisement, economic and educational marginalization 
and legal inequality. These histories have their origins in slavery and continue to be 
manifest – albeit in different ways and forms - around the Atlantic world and beyond.1 
The second set of questions have to do with the different ways in which the memory 
of slavery has been imagined, represented and mobilised in different places.  
The critical relationship between historical inheritance and cultural memory is, 
perhaps, most evident in the context of the recent – now Atlantic wide – reparations 
campaigns. Here, conceptions of trauma and healing on the one hand and political 
critique and material redress on the other collide. While the demand for reparation has 
a long history, it is receiving unprecedented publicity right at the moment.2 Finding 
ways to propel history and cultural memory into the adversarial sphere in order to 
make legal arguments about the liability of corporations, institutions and states has 
been a key component of the recent campaigns. These challenges have been bound by 
legal discretion but they have also served to open up wider – and forceful - arguments 
about the nature and meaning of historical and moral debt. In this sense, as David 
Scott has put it recently, the current reparations argument has the potential to 
‘redescribe the past’s relation to the present’ in ways that highlight the relationship 
between ‘debt’ on the one hand and ‘theft’ on the other. By demonstrating that debt 
and theft are ‘internally, not accidentally, connected’, the call for reparation demands 
that slavery be ‘fully integrated into the story of the making of the modern world’.3  
One of the ways of securing the notion of a concrete legacy is to engage in 
historical research projects that attempt to ‘trace the money’. For example, a decade 
ago, African American academics began to research the extent to which many of 
today’s multinational corporations have their foundations in slavery especially, banks, 
railroad and tobacco companies and insurance companies. More recently, the British 
based Legacies of British Slave-ownership research project has mined, and made 
publicly accessible, the records of the Slave Compensation Commission, instituted in 
1833, to organize the payment of the £20 million paid to British slave owners on the 
‘loss’ of their property as a result of the British Emancipation Act. Their research is 
enabling the delineation of a much more nuanced picture of not only the private 
wealth built on slaving but of the subsequent post-emancipation trajectories of monies 
acquired and funneled into nineteenth century businesses such as banking, railroads 
and insurance.4  
The landmark lawsuits, launched against American corporations (financial, 
railroad, tobacco, insurance and textile) and fought between 2002 and 2007 have 
since failed or stalled but they stimulated widespread public debate and provoked 
significant reaction.5	These cases, and the disclosures and apologies that they elicited, 
have become milestones in the ongoing argument for reparations, an argument that 
participates, at a historiographical level, in a culture of catastrophe, debt, and 
compensation in which, ironically enough, financial insurance is itself central.  
The fact that several of today’s large insurance companies – for example, 
Royal and Sun Alliance, AIG, New York Life, Aetna, and Lloyd’s - can trace their 
lineages back to the days of slavery is probably unsurprising. The eighteenth century 
‘commercial revolution’ coincided with the take off of modern finance capitalism. 
Although already long established, the further development of marine insurance in 
this context, in part, helped to organize and stabilise the terms for empire building and 
it quickly took on a moneymaking, capital accumulating, logic of its own.6 That it was 
extended, therefore, to help smooth the nerves of the thousands who entered the 
highly risky but extraordinarily lucrative business of human trafficking and provided 
a way for others to speculate on the venture at home is also probably not a surprise. 
The frame of the reparative, however, provokes further questions. What more can the 
scant and unlikely insurance archive reveal if rubbed against its unpromising grain 
and contextualized not only within the frames of business history or economic history 
but in relation to a wider legal, social and cultural context that, as I have suggested, is 
shaped currently by notions of risk, the promise of compensation and where 
attributions of value are increasingly measured and understood in monetary terms? 
How can the historical implication of insurance in the business of transatlantic slavery 
illuminate our current understandings of personhood, property and human agency? 
Given our hyper-speculative, hyper-financialised neoliberal contemporary culture and 
the coercive modes of subjectivity that it constructs for us, to ask questions about the 
ways in which the transatlantic slave trade contributed to the global spread of finance 
capital and about how finance capital has managed to colonise human life seem 
prescient. That European speculators invested in the slave trade through the 
mechanism of insurance might be a given but on what terms? 
 
As is well known, the transatlantic slave trade was one of the most lucrative 
but also one of the most risky of all overseas trade ventures during the eighteenth 
century. As one commentator put it in 1795, “The African commerce … holds 
forward one constant train of uncertainty, the time of slaving is precarious, the length 
of the middle passage uncertain, a vessel may be in part, or wholly cut off, mortalities 
may be great, and various other incidents may arise impossible to be foreseen”7 How 
then did traders and investors conceive of kidnapped and forcibly transported 
Africans for insurance purposes? If it was well known that ‘mortalities may be great’, 
what exactly did those with a financial interest in slave trading think they might be 
losing at sea? Were Africans conceived to be property or persons?  
The unstable mixture of personhood and property was intrinsic to the legal 
securing of plantation slavery itself but that instability began well before kidnapped 
Africans reached American landfall. In other words, it was during the period of transit 
at sea that Africans were forcibly transformed into the exchangeable commodities that 
they were understood to be when disembarked in the Americas. As Marcus Rediker 
has noted, the slave ship was a modern ‘war machine, mobile prison or factory’ that 
violently produced slaves en route to the Americas. He writes,  
in producing workers for the plantations the ship factory also produced ‘race’. 
At the beginning of the voyage, captains hired a motley crew of sailors who 
would on the coast of Africa become “white men”. Captains loaded on board 
the vessels multiethnic groups of Africans who would, in the American port, 
become “black people” or a “negro race”.8  
 
The voyages thus transformed those who made them and they depended on 
almost inexpressible physical violence. They also depended on conceptual violence. 
As well as guns, chains and whips, the slave ship’s log and ledger, the bill of lading, 
and account books were required to produce captives. African bodies were rendered 
through legally binding documentary practices that converted each one into an 
exchangeable unit. The numbers and columns of modern accountancy captured life 
and scaled it into credits and debits. Market calculations, abstraction, measurements 
of suffering and rubrics of equivalence all commuted life in to mere matter.9 The 
merchants also calibrated life and death into a mathematical equation when they took 
out insurance policies to cover their voyages. 
 
In order to track something of this latter process, we need to turn, in part, to 
legal history, and to note the law as it developed in the aid of empire and globalising 
commerce. No new concepts were developed in common law to deal with this new 
branch of modern maritime trade, ancient aspects of customary commercial law – or 
what was known as the Law Merchant - were simply co-opted for the purposes of 
transatlantic slave trading.10 The commercial concept that enabled marine insurance to 
be extended to captive Africans was ‘inherent vice’. The evocative term has an 
ancient history in maritime insurance law and it remains fundamental to the process 
whereby the risks associated with transporting goods are adjudicated for financial 
reasons today.11 
‘Inherent vice’ refers to the essential capacity of a commodity to perish or 
deteriorate. Insurers have never, and still do not, underwrite losses that are deemed as 
caused by the ‘inherent vice’ of a commodity. So for example, while in maritime 
transit, wine casks might leak, tobacco might dampen, wheat has the potential to 
molder, fruit to ferment, and iron can weaken. The oldest marine ordinances, dating 
back to the medieval period, devoted much space to establishing categories of 
especially corruptible or perishable goods. It is in these parts of the early documents 
of commercial law, that the boundaries separating things, animals and people were 
first established and then smudged for the purposes and for assigning their insurable 
value while in transit.12 During the period of the African slave trade, the legal question 
of how to adjudicate ship board deaths on the basis of ‘inherent vice’ served to 
contain and legitimize this imperative but it also came to be embroiled in what slave 
traders and speculators did not want to think about too closely or, indeed, to pay for. 
Unlike any other commodity, Africans could resist.   
When deployed in the context of underwriting African cargoes, ‘inherent vice’ 
referred to ‘natural death’. Fatalities aboard a slaving ship caused by disease 
epidemics, a lack of nourishment, and sadness unto death or suicide were manhandled 
together, and understood indiscriminately to be the result of ‘natural death’ and 
underwriters would not cover the risks of these things happening. In this sense, the 
term functioned as a formula of equivalence that legally and actually reduced so many 
people to so much inherently perishable matter.13   
 In this context, the use of the concept, ‘inherent vice’ as ‘natural death’, 
glossed the link between instrumental reason and violence helping to secure the 
economic efficiencies for which it was designed and practiced but it also generated 
wider historically powerful meanings that helped to reinforce the historical making of 
‘race’. If the majority of those who perished during the Middle Passage were 
understood to have done so as the result of some innate and invisible defect secreted 
within their own bodies, then those bodies were - prior to forced embarkation – 
already marked as not only civilisationally inferior but corporeally flawed. This 
assumption is reflected in the fact that the despair that killed no matter how slave ship 
crews tried to prevent it was named. It was termed, la melancolie noire by the French, 
and banzo by the Brazilians. British slave ships’ surgeons noted that Africans suffered 
from the lethal effects of ‘nostalgia’.14 In other words, the slave merchant’s 
‘knowledge’ contributed to a – racialised - history of madness. 
 
But there are other ways of looking at this history of untold victimhood and 
obliteration because as traders were well aware, Africans were a very particular type 
of commodity – one that might have been conceived as having the capacity to perish 
but also one – the only one - that could fight back. Revolts on board transatlantic 
slaving ships increased dramatically in the second half of the eighteenth century, with 
ten per cent of all voyages experiencing an insurrection.15 On French ships there was 
on average one revolt in twenty-five voyages.16 In response to African rebellion, slave 
traders demanded marine insurance policies that would cover them for losses incurred 
during an insurrection, underwriters looked for ways to minimize their costs and 
lawyers began to debate the terms on which such losses might, or might not be, 
eligible for compensation.  It was precisely the recurrence of shipboard revolt that 
required legal theorists, like slaveholders, to confront the contradiction of slave 
property, their dual character as human beings and as commodities. Yet they were 
also forced not only to recognize slaves’ humanity but also to consider their desire fro 
freedom. 
English marine insurers responded to these issues by taking instrumental steps 
that altered the extent of their financial coverage. Firstly, they began to refuse to 
underwrite the entirety of the slaving process; policy clauses excluded ‘trading in 
boats’. The phrase referred to the most incendiary part where Africans were 
transported from the shoreline to the large vessels moored off the coast. Secondly, 
they introduced, what we would now call, an ‘excess clause’. They would not 
compensate for insurrection if less than five per cent, or sometimes ten per cent, of the 
number of slaves held were killed.17 This form of policy, set out in John Weskett’s 
widely used insurance manual, first published in 1783, became standard in England, 
largely due to Lord Mansfield’s successive rulings, until insuring the slave trade 
became illegal in 1807.18  
French underwriters, however, returned to the concept of ‘inherent vice’. They 
looked to extend the reach of the concept so that it applied to losses arising from 
revolt during the Middle Passage as well as those caused by disease and la melancolie 
noire. If the capacity to violently resist could also be construed as a hidden defect 
lodged in the very nature of the commodity that they were so keen to underwrite, 
slave rebellion could be made uninsurable. 
In the same year that Weskett published his standardised marine insurance 
guide, Balthazard-Marie Emérigon, chief advocate in Marseille, published another 
one that would be used extensively around the Atlantic well into the nineteenth 
century.19 If Weskett’s Digest was designed as a practical and easily accessible 
condensation of key terms and legal points for all parties who had an interest in 
foreign trade, Emérigon’s treatise was a vast, and extremely thorough, scholarly work 
that had taken decades to assemble. It is an extraordinary text that traces expertly, and 
in minute detail, European jurisprudential developments in the context of marine 
insurance. It is also interlaced with Emérigon’s own reflections and, at times, vividly 
literary discursive interventions. Emérigon made it quite clear that he detested the 
slave trade and he devoted a chapter of his treatise to the legal issues concerning the 
‘Death and Revolt of Negros’. Here, he inveighed against the idea that African slave 
revolt might have anything to do with the essential capacities, or ‘natural’ qualities of 
a human being. In navigating his way through the question of the status of lost slaves 
as a form of property, Emérigon argued that the concept, ‘inherent vice’, could not be 
applied to the internal constitution of human beings, and he made a set of remarkable 
statements in the process. Referring back to Colbert’s ‘Ordonnance de la Marine’ of 
1681, he argued that ‘la vice propre de la chose’ refers to, 
 the physical corruption that corrodes, spoils and destroys merchandize 
properly so called; and that the words decay, diminution, deterioration, 
spoiling, perishing, commonly used relate neither to the affection of the 
human mind, nor to the violent struggle produced by the love of liberty.20  
 
Reverting to classical injunction, he then stated,   
 
When one takes Negroes on board, they are one’s enemy, for as the Scythian 
ambassadors said to Alexander, there is never friendship between a master and 
slave, in the midst of peace the right of war still subsists. The insurers of a 
vessel embarking on a slaving voyage knows that enemies will be brought on 
board and, who, by their actions may cause the loss of the ship: an insurrection 
is always a peril of the sea.21  
 
Emérigon’s assertion, that shipboard revolt was to be understood as politically 
targeted and fully appropriate resistance, meant that the losses sustained in such an 
event should, for insurance purposes, be automatically covered by a standard marine 
policy that included attacks by ‘enemies’. More generally, his statements rendered 
slavery historical, contingent, and certainly not essential. Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
subsequent French marine insurance lawyers took issue with Emérigon’s dismissal of 
the applicability of ‘inherent vice’ to cases of insurrection in the transatlantic trade. 
Financial implications (for underwriters) aside, Emérigon’s intervention removed 
African captives from the generic list of things that could be categorized simply as 
perishable cargo, and thereby exposed the practice of modern slave trading for what it 
was. 
In 1810, the French lawyer, Jean Julièn Estrangin, explicitly countered 
Emérigon’s reasoning while re-considering the things for which an underwriter was 
not liable. He re-asserted that losses accrued by the ‘natural death’ of ‘animals or 
negros’ could not be compensated, and that the exception included the latter’s death 
by despair or suicide because both eventualities were arrived at by ‘la nature ou la 
vice de la chose’ or sometimes by the master’s negligence. He noted that it was 
inevitable that slavers would embark ‘men’ who may perish because of their despair 
or by suicide as these were ways of escaping enslavement and the treatment that they 
experienced aboard ship. In order to diffuse Emérigon’s misplaced politics, he also 
pointed out that it was inevitable that African captives would rise up. For Estangin, all 
the ‘inevitabilities’ were analogous: death from revolt and despair should be equally 
attributed to the ‘vice’ or ‘la caractère de la chose’ and, as such, charged to the ship 
owners unless other particular causal circumstances could be found.22  
In 1827, Emérigon’s treatise was re-published by Pierre Sèbastien Boulay-
Paty. He also inveighed against Emérigon even though the French government had 
outlawed the transatlantic slave trade, and thus banned its legal insurance, in 1818. It 
is difficult to be certain why Boulay-Paty bothered with the intervention, given that 
the legal issues were no longer applicable. Memories of the Haitian Revolution, 
however, were fresh in the 1820s while the continuing French slave trade remained an 
unresolved problem and the subject of contested public debate.  
Despite the fact that Emérigon’s argument was, in effect, no longer relevant, it 
seems that his comments required a response. After all, he had, in a few brief words, 
punctured the idealized rules of commerce by transforming enslaved Africans into 
legitimate defenders of their freedom against imperial tyranny. Moreover, his 
classical reference had laced African suffering with republican dignity. In these terms, 
acts of rebellious self-destruction on the violent fringes of Empire were stoical and 
patriotic suicides rather than as barbaric depravities or heathen sins.  
In annotating Emérigon’s championing of the enslaved’s right to ‘liberty or 
death’, Boulay-Paty wrote that, ‘the Stoics allowed the suicide of their sage’, though 
the ‘Platonists say that God gives you life and you must not take it without his 
permission,’ Envisioning captive Africans as so many water-borne and cowardly 
Catos, he went on to assert, ‘[t]he so-called heroism of the Stoic was weak and 
desperate. He gave up his life to avoid the stomach-ache which he did not have the 
courage to endure’.23 In legal terms, these pointed annotations were superfluous. 
Boulay-Paty agreed with all other previous experts that African death from despair or 
suicide and revolt should be excepted on the basis of ‘inherent vice’ or pathological 
defect. All these causes of death stemmed from the ‘same affections of the soul’ and 
all were ‘products of the desire to escape slavery’: they were born in the ‘caractère de 
la chose’.24  
So emerging from the archive of marine insurance law, entangled in the forms 
of monetary value and profit, and propelled by the actions of enslaved rebels, came 
the profoundly modern philosophical and political question – how is the impulse to 
defend human freedom to be understood? Was it an essential or innate capacity 
attributable to all humanity? If it was, could it be deemed as an ‘inherent vice’? Did 
this ‘capacity’ have to do with human nature or second nature? Why did this kind of 
reflection matter? It came to matter because, as the debate between the French 
lawyers indicates, the question of whether one could legally and financially 
underwrite the consequences of ongoing violent resistance to enslavement – provoked 
by the African captives themselves - took place as an increasingly effective set of 
campaigns against slave trading and slavery gathered pace and in a period indelibly 
shaped by the American, French and Haitian revolutions.  In this wider context, the 
alienating commercial term, ‘inherent vice’, and the question of whether or nor it 
could be applied to human beings, became charged with political meaning.  
 
In 1845, a high profile marine insurance case was heard on Appeal in the New 
Orleans Supreme Court. It was a dispute over a claim for the so-called loss of a cargo 
of enslaved African Americans who had not perished, or been killed as the result of 
their resistance but who had escaped. An American slave ship called the Creole had 
been carrying 135 enslaved African Americans from Virginia to the New Orleans 
slave markets. It was one of thousands of vessels plying the route as part of the 
burgeoning ‘domestic’ slave trade that developed after the Americans formally ended 
their part in the transatlantic slave trade in 1808. Near the Bahamas, the captives rose 
up, took over the ship and demanded that it be sailed into Nassau. The British had 
abolished slavery in 1838 and on arrival, the Africans were eventually – after 
extraordinary pressure from local Bahamians - legally declared to be free persons.25 
The action caused a diplomatic incident between the US and Britain but it also 
registered as a set of insurance claims for the loss of the American trader’s property.26 
The Creole, like most of the ships operating in the domestic slave trade, was not a 
dedicated slave-producing machine as the large transatlantic slavers had been.  It 
carried passengers and other cargo – tobacco in this instance – as well as captives. 
Security was lax despite the financial value of what was aboard.  
The traders had covered their cargo against standard ‘perils of the sea’ but not 
all of them had not bothered to insure against the possibility of insurrection. 
Therefore, it was in the underwriter’s interest to argue that the uprising had been the 
cause of the trader’s loss rather than subsequent ‘British interference’. Again, no new 
legal concepts had been developed in commercial law to support a domestic maritime 
slave trade. American underwriters drew on European legal conventions – notably, 
from the English and French marine traditions - that had long been used in the 
transatlantic trade. The debate about the applicability of the marine insurance term, 
‘inherent’ vice’ to forcibly trafficked people exploded in the middle of the hearing. 
The lawyers for the insurance company seized on the concept in order to appeal to the 
universal and innate human impulse for freedom. In an extraordinary brief, given the 
antebellum context in which they were arguing, they claimed that the slave owners 
should not be compensated because they had ignored a fundamental truth when fitting 
out and prosecuting the voyage: that the ‘nature of the slave’ was marked by an ‘ever 
wakeful and ever active longing after liberty.’27  
In an attempt to avoid the attribution of their loss to the mutiny, the trader’s 
lawyers raised Emérigon’s objections to the relevance of ‘inherent vice’ in relation to 
human beings. But they were not prepared to follow through with the terms of 
Emérigon’s argument. They could not countenance the captives as legitimate 
enemies. They argued for their criminal agency instead of their political agency by 
suggesting that their loss had been caused by piracy; attack by pirates was a risk that 
was covered by standard marine insurance policies as one of the ‘perils of the sea’. 
The defendants made short shrift of Emérigon’s argument as illogical, and they cited 
Estrangin and Boulay-Paty in their argument. They also dismissed the notion that 
slaves could turn pirate. They argued that the slaves had not been motivated by 
plunder but by the ‘mere desire of liberty’. Moreover, the policy covered ‘external 
attack’ and ‘the carrying off of the slaves by pirates, not the case of the subject matter 
of the insurance itself assuming a piratical character.’28 
The underwriters won the Appeal case although not on the basis of the 
‘inherent vice’ argument in the end. For Judge Bullard, there was insufficient official 
evidence to confirm that the British had ‘interfered’ in Nassau beyond acceding to the 
demands of the American Consul who had been present when the vessel entered the 
harbor. He concluded that ‘the insurrection of the slaves was the cause of breaking up 
the voyage, and prevented that part of the cargo, which consisted of slaves, from 
reaching the port of New Orleans’.29 In his summing up, however, he returned to the 
concept of ‘inherent vice’ in order to dismiss its clearly incendiary potential in the 
context of slave ship rebellion by attending to local conditions. In this sense, he 
sought to affirm the legitimacy of the American ‘domestic’ slave trade by contrasting 
it to the outlawed transatlantic trade, and the ‘types’ of captives at issue in each case. 
He suggested that there existed an essential difference between enslaved Africans and 
enslaved African Americans. The application of ‘inherent vice’, he said, was not 
‘unreasonable’ with regard to Africans who fought back during the Middle Passage, 
as a consequence of their being ‘reduced for the first time to a servile condition, and 
when their resistance might be regarded as anything but criminal.’30  
Two of the Creole’s insurance policies had covered insurrection, and the 
ruling meant that the insurers were liable for these losses. The lawyers took up the 
Judge’s comments as grounds for demanding a re-hearing to see if they could reverse 
the decision. In their brief, they took explicit objection to the Judge’s historicizing 
comments because they threatened to cancel the abstractions that the concept of 
‘inherent vice’ supported. These were abstractions designed to transcend geopolitical 
boundaries in the name of protecting mercantile profit, and which captured for 
financial purposes the durabilities, or otherwise, of valuable slaves. For them, the 
essential origin of the cause of the loss was at issue. The morality, legality or the 
geographical place of the ‘cause’ was therefore irrelevant.31 
Judge Bullard threw the application for a re-hearing out. He was not 
convinced by the lawyer’s argument that ‘inherent vice’ was a universal concept. He 
did not think that it could be applied to the Creole at all. In fact, he took up 
Emérigon’s original objection to the idea that the spirit of revolt could be construed as 
a kind of pathologised defect in the slave though indirectly.32 The concrete issue for 
him was the fact that only nineteen of the full cargo of captives had engaged in the 
mutiny. He stated that, ‘however plausible it may appear to apply to those few, the 
principle that relates to the natural decay or self-combustion of the subject matter 
insured, we do not clearly perceive how it can apply to others who remained passive.’ 
He concluded, ‘[o]n the contrary, we think, their forcible resistance to the authority of 
the master of the vessel on the voyage, was a peril within the policy.’33 With these 
final words, Bullard, in line with Emérigon’s reasoning, loosened the case from a 
commercial legal structure in the which the nature of slaves, construed as 
commodities, was at stake, and recognized their act as mutiny and its agents for what 
they were – human beings.  
In order to protect their interests, eighteenth and nineteenth century 
underwriters and their lawyers adopted an ancient, and mobile, maritime concept, 
‘inherent vice’, but then had to grapple with it in the attempt to ‘account’ for the 
insurgency of what needed to be construed as a transportable commodity. Consistent 
and ongoing resistance within the Atlantic slave trades, forced the concept to unfold 
in strange ways: insurers used it to argue away the bases of their profit-making in 
order to secure their profits, turning abolitionist when it suited them insofar as they 
argued for the essential humanity and agency of the commodities that brought them 
their business. On the other hand, slave merchants seeking recompense for their 
bloody adventures were forced to acknowledge their reified cargos as fugitives, 
pirates, freedom fighters, and insurgents. Nobody had asked the enslaved aboard the 
Creole for their version of the uprising: their voices were inadmissible in law. 
Moreover, no historical record exists of their fate once they disembarked as self-
emancipated men and women and disappeared into the Atlantic vortex. Nevertheless, 
their spectacular actions left a wake of economic and legal chicanery swirling around 
the macabre concept of ‘inherent vice’ and around the nature of human property. 
 
The marine insurance archive provides evidence of what needed to be kept 
silent. In a sense, it can be seen as little more than an accumulation of silences. 
Nevertheless, it offers rich material if read against its unpromising grain, and pitted 
against its antithesis, the archive of the revolutionary Black Atlantic. Doing so opens 
up the legacy of the transatlantic slave trade and resistance secreted deep within the 
historical contours of modern speculative finance capitalism and its contemporary 
practice. The implication of the modern insurance industry in the history of slaving is 
enabling new ways of tracking and representing the profits of slavery thereby shaping 
and energising the contemporary demand for reparation. The aim here has been to 
shed some light on how that legacy helped to yoke our modern meanings of 
commerce, commodity and civility together. The concept of ‘inherent vice’ remains 
central to the underwriting of all transportable goods. It was key to a 1938 Baltimore 
insurance case concerning a cargo of bananas that had perished as the result of a 
stranding. A legal precedent, Tatham v. Hodgson (1796) was cited in the final 
ruling.34 No further comment was made about the fact that this was an English case 
brought not about fruit but for a cargo of 168 kidnapped Africans, two thirds of who 
had died during a horrifically long Middle Passage.35 That case is a stark reminder 
that the marine insurance business sought to profit from death and not from life. The 
case of the Creole complicates that legacy. By the last decades of the eighteenth 
century, African captives determined to resist their fate through shipboard rebellion 
had already forced the question of whether a captured African – en route to his or her 
life of enslavement – could be the object of insurance, and if so on what terms. The 
question demanded an acknowledgement of human agency, however circumscribed, 
glossed or rationalized. It continued to disturb the commercial legal structures that 
had long supported commercial trading in enslaved peoples well into the nineteenth 
century, and even beyond. In this sense, exposing the place of slavery in the 
development of financial insurance contributes to, what we might call ‘reparative 
history’.  
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